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Abstract 
The expansion of wind-generation in the United States poses significant challenges 
to policy-makers, particularly because wind’s intermittency and unpredictability can 
exacerbate problems of congestion on a transmission constrained grid.  Understanding 
these issues is necessary if optimal development of wind energy and transmission is to 
occur.  This paper applies a model that integrates the special concerns of electricity 
generation to empirically consider the challenges of developing wind resources in the 
Rocky Mountain region of the United States.  Given the lack the high frequency data needed 
to address the special problems of intermittency and congestion, our solution is to create a 
dispatch model of the region and to use simulations to generate the necessary data, then 
use this data to understand the development patterns that have occurred as wind 
resources have been developed. 
 Our results indicate that the price effects caused by changes in power output at 
intermittent sources are strongly dependent on supply conditions and the presence of 
market distortions caused by transmission constraints.  Peculiarities inherent in electric 
grid operation can cause system responses that are not always intuitive.  The distribution 
of the rents accruing to wind generation, particularly in unexpectedly windy periods are 
strongly dependent on the allocation of transmission rights when congestion occurs, which 
impacts potential returns to developing wind resources.  Incidents of congestion depend on 
the pace of development of wind and transmission capacity.  Not accounting for such 
distortions may cause new development to worsen market outcomes if mistaken estimates 
of benefits or costs lead to sub-optimal development of wind and transmission facilities.   
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Introduction:   
The expansion of wind-generation in the United States poses significant challenges 
to policy-makers.  Of primary concern is how to incorporate wind and other renewable 
resources into the existing electricity-grid while maintaining power supply at low cost and 
high reliability.  On the supply side, adding generation with the unique characteristics of 
wind and solar power to the grid presents significant reliability and cost challenges.  
Electricity cannot easily be stored and the intermittency and unpredictability of these 
sources can make scheduling electricity in a reliable but efficient way difficult.  
Transmission capacity and network congestion also complicate these efforts (see Green 
and Vasilakos, 2008, DOE, 2009 and NREL, 2010 as examples).  On the demand side, 
electricity demand is unresponsive to cost change, lacking both the information to react to 
cost conditions and changes, and the short-run flexibility to meaningfully change an 
inelastic demand.  Given supply must always equal demand on an electricity system and 
that demand does not respond to changes in the availability of wind energy, sudden 
increases in windpower can cause significant economic changes as well as operational 
problems on the electricity-grid.  This paper attempts to illuminate some of these problems 
and their interrelationships with a simulated model of the Rocky Mountain Power Area.    
Among renewable sources, wind power poses the most serious challenge to 
electricity network planners and regulators due to the intermittency of the resource.  While 
back-up sources can be added to the grid for use when wind or other renewable resource 
availability is low, these large fixed capital investments are costly and their use as a 
backstop ensures lower capital return and higher system costs than when the same 
technologies are used as primary generators.  The determination of optimal diversity of 
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generation sources, along with the spatial location of wind generating sources could reduce 
the potential intermittency of total generation, and reduce the fixed costs of back-up 
sources necessary to ensure system reliability.   
Location of wind resources, however, often requires transmission capacity to 
deliver power to market when it is available.  Since intermittency exists, the coordination of 
wind generation to total demand on a fixed transmission system can be difficult and result 
in problems of congestion.  Congestion may occur due to demand spikes in one portion of 
the grid requiring delivery of additional power using the transmission network, or from 
unexpected increases in renewable generation, which strains the transmission system 
capacity to deliver this low-cost power to load.  When such congestion events occur, local 
rents can be created for generators in areas where congestion constrains deliverable 
energy as the value of energy on the downstream side of any constraint rises relative to 
uncongested conditions.  Significant rents may not only be created for generators within 
the areas affected by constrained delivery capacity, but they may also be created for the 
holders of transmission rights able to deliver to such areas.  Understanding the stochastic 
nature of wind energy and the grid-cost dynamics of this resource also requires an 
understanding of system-wide transmission outcomes and the associated economic rents 
generated by wind installations. This requires a modeling framework that mimics the 
special nature of electricity markets, the problems posed by inelastic demand and lack of 
inventory or storage. 
A challenge to the empirical study of renewable energy integration is a lack of data, 
specifically high frequency (hourly or higher frequency) wholesale electricity price data 
that describe market outcomes.  Spot prices for electricity are not available in many areas 
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as spot markets do not exist.  Where such markets exist, prices are often reported as an 
index of average prices representing lower frequency intervals.  The nature of demand, 
renewable generation changes, as well as transmission congestion on an electricity system 
is that they are intermittent.  Congestion can occur for only minutes or for several hours in 
a day and then disappear for several hours or days depending on network conditions.  In 
order to understand the nature of intermittent sources, congestion rents and price impacts, 
high frequency (hourly or better) data is necessary.  To overcome this challenge simulation 
methods are used here to model market prices and estimate potential congestion effects 
using available hourly demand and transmission data.       
This paper informs policy with a simulation model of an electricity grid that 
incorporates the stochastic nature of wind resources to explore the dynamics of system 
costs.   Results are presented for a model of the Rocky Mountain Power Area (RMPA), an 
area that encompasses most of the state of Wyoming, all of the state of Colorado and small 
areas of some adjacent states in the western United States.  This geographic region is of 
particular interest to consider the potential economic issues of integrating wind resources 
for several reasons.  First, areas of the RMPA have some of the best potential for wind 
power development in the United States.  Second, this area experienced a significant build-
out of wind development and other transmission sources over a short period of time while 
transmission capacity and other grid conditions remained relatively unchanged.  Third, 
because of its relative size compared to other control regions in the United States, the 
Rocky Mountain Area is more easily modeled than other larger regions.  These 
characteristics allow a study of the area to inform and quantify the congestion costs of 
integrating large quantities of wind energy onto an electricity grid.   
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The RMPA simulation model maximizes estimated producer surplus (minimizes 
system cost) in a competitive electricity wholesale market while meeting transmission 
constraints and power demand on an hourly basis. Using actual data from the years 2008 
to 2010, hourly generation, price outcomes and network congestion conditions are 
simulated.  Two types of generation sources are used with unique cost and capacity 
characteristics reflecting actual field relationships: (i) traditional and non-intermittent 
sources including fossil-fuel generating (coal and natural gas) units and hydro-electric 
generation, historically developed to exploit the existing natural resources in the study 
area, (ii) wind generators whose cost and capacity conditions reflect the local stochastic 
climate conditions.  Using the model output, hourly estimates are computed of efficient 
power market prices.  When transmission congestion occurs these are used to estimate 
congestion rents that occur over a three-year period.  These rents form an estimate of the 
social benefits of reducing grid congestion through possible transmission system expansion 
if additional renewable resources are to be added to the electrical grid.  Congestion rents 
are also related to wind outcomes to describe the potential impediments to wind 
development caused by grid conditions, and which may explain observed patterns of actual 
development while predicting future challenges to additional large scale wind 
development.   
Such information is critically important to policy-makers, especially if there is to 
continue to be public-sector involvement in fostering conditions for renewable energy 
development and integration, and in identifying where such public involvement would be 
most beneficial.  For example, the state of Wyoming’s wind generation capacity in the 
RMPA increased by a factor of eight from 2007 to 2010, jumping from 143.4 MW of 
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potential capacity in 2007 to over 1,129 MW.  Since then, however, no new generation 
capacity has been added yet the potential in the state is still largely untapped. In Colorado 
during the period from 2008-2010 only 236 MW of wind capacity was built (increasing 
from 1063 MW to 1299 MW), but since then it has increased by over 500MW, with an 
additional 16,602 MW planned.1  This shift in development has had significant economic 
impact on both states.  According to officials in Wyoming and Colorado, the greatest 
impediment to additional development in both states is the lack of transmission capacity 
out of the RMPA.  Transmission congestion between Wyoming and Colorado within the 
RMPA, however, has also been cited as the reason why development in Colorado continues 
to occur while in Wyoming development has not since 2010, despite the fact that wind 
resources in Wyoming are considered to be better than those in Colorado. To overcome 
this hurdle the state of Wyoming embarked on financing transmission capacity 
enhancement between the two states estimated to cost between $200 and $300 million.  
Some might wonder why, if such development were so valuable, is state involvement 
necessary when in the past private entities have developed such transmission capacity? 
This question is even more relevant given several multi-billion dollar fully private projects 
are underway to expand potential transmission capacity out of Wyoming to locations over 
five times more distant than Colorado loads.  This puzzle regarding why there is less 
private interest in making smaller investments to improve transmission infrastructure to 
nearby markets than to embark on very expensive projects to serve more distant ones is 
also an example of questions that might be answered using such a model.      
                                                          
1
 American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) website, 2012. 
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The paper proceeds as follows:  a description of the generation, transmission and 
institutional context present in the western United States and Canada is described and the 
study region is introduced.  A simple theoretical model is then presented to describe the 
electricity dispatch problem.   A solution to this system provides a simulation framework 
that can then be parameterized for the study region.  A simple parameterization of the 
Rocky Mountain Power Area is outlined in a static context to demonstrate how problems of 
intermittency and transmission capacity can impact energy cost outcomes.  Solutions are 
then presented from the hourly simulation model. These results are used to estimate 
market price outcomes and to describe how the rents created by wind generation can vary 
with the stochastic nature of wind as an energy resource, as well as the stochastic nature of 
electricity demand, and how these rents could be influenced by the existence of specific 
transmission constraints.  Conclusions are then presented based on the findings described. 
 
Electricity Generation in the Rocky Mountain Power Area.  
 
The North American electricity-grid in Canada and the United States actually 
consists of three separate and isolated grids, the eastern and western interconnects, and 
the ERCOT (Texas) interconnect. These span the United States and Canada and include a 
small portion of Mexico.  The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
administrates standards to ensure the coordination between interconnections and the 
reliability of the grid within each.  Electricity generation and supply in the western United 
States and Canada is administrated by the Western Electricity Coordinating Council 
(WECC), which further sub-divides this grid into four reporting areas, one of which is the 
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Rocky Mountain Power Area (RMPA). The geographic boundaries of the WECC 
administrated western interconnection and the RMPA are shown in Figure 1. 
The Rocky Mountain Power Area (RMPA) provides power to over 5.5 million people 
within all or parts of five US states: the entire state of Colorado, eastern and central 
Wyoming, portions of western South Dakota and Nebraska, and a small area in the extreme 
northwest corner of New Mexico.  Figure 2 presents the RMPA transmission network.  
Power to retail customers is primarily supplied by three regulated investor owned utilities, 
and several much smaller municipal utilities and rural electric associations.2  These entities 
engage in generation and/or purchase wholesale power through bilateral trades with 
suppliers of electricity.  Generation facilities are located throughout the RMPA, however 
renewable sources; specifically wind generators are primarily located in central Wyoming 
and northeastern Colorado.  Transmission access to deliver generated power to RMPA 
load-centers may be scheduled through utilities’ own transmission facilities or through two 
transmission networks.  A simplified schematic of the RMPA transmission networks is 
shown in Figure 2. The simulations presented here assume an efficient market outcome 
and ignore any price distortions that may actually occur due to institutional realities.3   
Modeling Framework 
 To model and evaluate the wind energy generation, transmission and policy issues 
within the RMPA, a Decoupled (DC) power-flow modeling framework is used to model 
                                                          
2
 Three investor owned utilities serve the RMPA: Rocky Mountain Power (a subsidiary of PacifiCorp) in central and 
southeast Wyoming, Black Hills Power serving eastern Wyoming, parts of Nebraska, South Dakota and Colorado, 
and the Public Service Company of Colorado (Xcel Energy) serving central Colorado including the Denver region.  
There are also 29 municipal utilities in Colorado and three in Wyoming, 15 rural electrical cooperatives in the 
RMPA area of Wyoming and 26 in Colorado (Navigant, 2010 and Wyoming Office of Consumer Advocate website).           
3
 The RMPA does not utilize an organized power market. Some authors have noted that the existence of multiple 
power providing agencies using bilateral power contracts could result in a less than efficient outcome (Beck, 2009).  
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hourly generation price and generation outcomes as an approximation of the actual AC 
system.4 The modeling framework follows the nodal pricing model outlined by Green 
(2007) and formalizes the choice of generation sources used (referred to as “dispatch”) to 
serve a given demand or “load” subject to the technical constraints of the electric-power 
network. The general modeling problem to in each period assumes that the system 
maximizes producer surplus (minimizes generation cost) given electricity demand 
(Equation 1) by choice of power generated across a set of generators.5 The relevant cost of 
electricity generation is the variable cost of producing power output measured in 
megawatts (MW), and ignores fixed costs of production.6  Equation 1 is maximized subject 
to the technical constraints of the system; specifically that total generation in any node 
cannot exceed the individual generator capacities within that node (Equation 2), that total 
generation plus any net imports of power and demand including line losses are always 
balanced (Equation 3), that transmission flows do not exceed capacity constraints 
(Equation 4), and that generators produce a non-negative power level that is less than or 
equal to their given capacities (Equation 5). 7 Generation and demand occurs at all nodes in 
                                                          
4
 Such a modeling framework simplifies an AC power-flow optimization problem by linearization.  Since AC voltage 
is sinusoidal, any optimization solution requires the voltage and phase angle to be defined at each node in our 
model. Such power-flow solutions can be "maddeningly difficult to obtain" (Overbye et al, 2004).  For this reason it 
is very common in planning problems like ours to use a simplification, a "decoupled" (DC) load flow model by 
assuming the resistance of the transmission lines in our system is much less than their reactance. This is a 
reasonable assumption for the line lengths in our system and allows us to consider only real power ignoring 
reactive power outcomes.  For a comparison of the AC Optimal Power Flow problem and the simplification 
involved in using a DC load-flow system, see NREL (2011), pages 76-78.  For a discussion of the differences in 
outcomes between AC Optimal Power Flow modeling and DC modeling, see Overbye et al. (2004).   Generally it is 
accepted that a DC modeling methodology is reasonable to determine general economic outcomes that determine 
system pricing and generation (see Green, 2007).  
5
 Unlike Green, 2007, due to the hourly frequency of the simulation we take reported hourly demand within the 
region as given.  This makes the demand modeled perfectly inelastic.   
6
 This is consistent with the theory of profit maximization in the short run.  Variable costs include fuel and 
production input costs, operation and maintenance costs that vary with the quantity of output. See standard 
textbook descriptions of electricity market theory such as Stoft (2002) for an overview of the relevant cost factors.        
7
 We assume that the all generators face no constraints regarding the ability to supply less than full capacity. 
11 
 
the transmission system, and transmission allows power flow between nodes.  The 
problem is solved repeatedly on an hourly basis, using hourly demand, transmission 
capacity and generation constraints.  
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The associated Lagrangian for the problem above suppressing  constraints (2) and (4) for clarity is 
defined as: 
       
 
   
          
 
   
 
   
        
 
   
            
 
   
 
   
 
                                                                                                                                     
where dk is the net demand at node k, pk is the price of power at node k, and c(wj,k) is the 
cost to generate power wj,k at generator j in node k where k = 1, 2 given the RMPA can be 
modeled as a 2-node network.  Marginal costs at each generator are modeled as constant 
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thus the total cost of at each generator is the product of the marginal cost and the level 
generated, while the total cost of generated power is the sum of the individual generators j 
costs across both nodes k.  The flow of power along the transmission line connecting nodes 
k = 1, 2 is denoted by z.  .  The transmission line between nodes 1 and 2 has a fixed capacity 
of zmax and flow on the transmission line is defined as the difference between demand and 
supply within each node.  The energy balance constraint equates the sum of total demand 
plus total line losses, l. to total supplied energy which includes total generated power and  
NI, the exogenous system net imports of generated power from outside the RMPA.    The 
Lagrangian multiplier e is associated with the energy balance constraint, and TS is the 
multiplier associated with the transmission line capacity constraint.  The first order 
conditions of equation (6) with respect to optimal choice of generator output (dispatch) 
taking constraints and net imports as given can be used to define the optimal price at each 
node in the 2-node system: 
          
  
   
               .8 
The multiplier on the energy balance constraint is equal to the marginal cost of generation 
at the swing bus in the absence of line losses, where the swing bus is the node defined to 
contain the last unit of generation called upon in an optimal (cost-minimizing) dispatch 
plus any change in line losses.  Line losses may change with changes in demand. Increasing 
line losses would require a greater than one unit increase in generation to create one more 
unit of power at the load.  If, however, due to line constraints, the optimal configuration of 
generators across the network changed to accommodate the extra power needed for such 
                                                          
8
 In more complicated systems with more than one route to some nodes, net transfer distribution factors 
describing net power flows must also be defined.  See the Appendix in Green (2007).     
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losses, it can be the case that line losses fall (the additional power is generated on the other 
side of the transmission constraint), resulting in less than one unit of additional generated 
power being necessary to create one additional unit of power delivered to final demand. 
For this reason the partial derivative is required in the parentheses and it may be positive 
or negative.9    
The second term in this equation shows how line constraints affect marginal costs at 
each node. When the transmission constraint is non-binding, TS =0 and the price in the two 
nodes is equal.  Consider a cost-minimizing outcome in a 2-node system and suppose that 
in the optimal solution the combined load of both nodes is just met by the combined 
generation in each node, with the last unit of generation dispatched in the upstream node.  
If a single transmission line operates between the nodes and is just at maximum capacity 
(in which case the transmission line is said to be “just congested”), any additional unit of 
demand added at the downstream node will require the additional generation to take place 
in that node and the transmission constraint will be binding.  The price in node 2 will differ 
from that in node 1, with the price in node 1 equal to the price of the marginal unit of 
generation there, and the price in node 2 equal to the price of the marginal generation at 
the new source of generation.  The value of TS would then become the difference between 
the marginal costs of the last generators dispatched in each node.  The second multiplier in 
(7) is therefore the difference between the cost of power on the network at the swing bus 
and the marginal cost at a node with a line constraint.  
                                                          
9
 In electrical systems it is possible the additional unit of power would cause power flows to change across the 
network and could reduce line losses (see Green, 2007 or Stoft, 2002) 
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To implement the model in a simulation context the transmission network 
described in Figure 2 was reduced to a 2-node network.  This methodology is consistent 
with published results in other power studies including DOE (2009).10  Node 1 comprises 
all areas in the RMPA north of Wyoming border and Node 2 all areas south (the state of 
Colorado).  Power can flow between Wyoming and Colorado only using a transmission 
pathway referred to in the industry as Path 36/TOT3.  Figure 3 presents the simplified 
nodal network, identifying average demands, generation capacities transmission capacities 
used in the simulations.  WECC Path Data is used to define NI for the pathways shown in 
Figure 2 leading out of the RMPA and it is subtracted from total nodal loads consistent with 
Equation 3.11      
Implementing the simulation model also required identifying RMPA generation 
potential.  Generator capacities by site were defined using EIA form 860 data for over 360 
individual sources.  Fuel sources within the RMPA include coal, natural gas, hydropower, 
diesel fuel, wind, solar power, and renewable gases.  Table 1 describes generation capacity 
by fuel type or power source within the RMPA at the end of 2008 and changes in capacity 
through 2010.  The growth of wind resources is clear – wind potential grows 66% from 
8.8% to 13.1% of total generation capacity from 2008-2010.  The growth in wind capacity 
is even more dramatic when considered by node.  Wind generation capacity in Wyoming 
(Node 1) increased from 143 MW to 1130 MW of potential power, while Colorado Wind 
potential increased by 229 MW to 1292.1 MW over the same period. The only other major 
                                                          
10
 WECC (2012) and DOE (2009) model the RMPA as a three-node system splitting Colorado into eastern and 
western nodes. Both studies find no congestion on this pathway, these two areas are modeled as a single node.       
11
 Data for the TOT80 southeast Montana link is only available in 2010 and average only 50MW.  We assume in 
other years these flows are zero.  Path 19 is also not included. It operates at 100% capacity to export power from 
two dedicated plants in Wyoming that do not serve the RMPA.  Remaining lines in Figure 2 are used to define NI.   
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source of growth in generation capacity over this time period was in coal generation, which 
increased by 12%, increasing coal’s share of total potential generation from 40.4% to 
40.8%.        
To estimate an efficient dispatch outcome that minimizes total generation costs, 
individual generator marginal costs must be identified or estimated. Since such costs are 
proprietary, little of such data exists publicly.  Many cost estimates exist in the economic 
and policy literature, but these studies most often consider the capital costs necessary to 
create new generating capacity, which are inappropriate for use in the theoretic model 
described. 12   Marginal generator costs are estimated using published production 
engineering estimates of their determinants, plant characteristics from EIA Form 860 data, 
published fuel and transport costs, and transmission costs based on the location of 
generators.  The methodology used to estimate these costs deterministically is detailed in 
the Appendix.13 Figure 4 shows the modeled efficient dispatch “merit order” or supply 
curve for the entire RMPA assuming no transmission congestion occurs between nodes 
using summer 2008 reported peak capacities, and estimated marginal costs by generator 
expressed in 2008 dollars.  Maximum generator capacities are shown by fuel type, which 
determines plant marginal costs.  Lowest cost generators in the dispatch order are 
renewable sources: solar, wind and hydro as their fuel is effectively free and the only costs 
                                                          
12
 Studies often consider “levelized” costs of energy - the cost of generation necessary for a plant to break even 
over its operating lifetime.  This is computed as the present value of all capital and fixed costs, financing costs and 
forecasted operating costs including fuel over the projected lifetime of the plant, divided by the present value of 
energy output from the plant.  Other studies cite the “overnight cost” of a plant - the total cost to construct a plant 
if it were built in one night. Neither of these costs is appropriate to model dispatch and only marginal production 
costs are used. See Stoft (2002).     
13
 An alternative method is to derive plant efficiencies using reported fuel use and output also reported on the EIA 
Form 860 surveys.  This was attempted, however, missing or incomplete data across some generators combined 
with problems in the reported data that yielded unreasonable efficiencies. 
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faced are those operations and maintenance costs that increase with output.  Solar and 
wind power have significant intermittency and the potential effect on the estimated supply 
curve of wind intermittency in particular is shown by the broken line, which reduces wind 
capacity to 12% of potential capacity as used by NERC to estimate system reliability. If 
renewables were to provide 100% potential power, this would shift the supply curve by 
about 1300MW to the right, and this could significantly alter power market conditions.                       
To illustrate the hourly power dispatch market outcomes the simulation model 
computes (without the complication of transmission congestion) and how they vary with 
the potential intermittency of wind generation, Figure 4 shows summary measures of 
actual 2008 hourly RMPA load data reported, along with NERC’s summer 2008 forecast 
peak load (NERC, 2008).  The efficient market price and quantity of electricity is shown for 
the minimum, maximum (average and forecast), average, 5% and 95% load levels by the 
intersection of the supply curve and these demand levels, conditional on wind output.14  
The estimated equilibrium wholesale price of electricity in the market would have ranged 
from a minimum cost of $15.38/MWh to a maximum of $77.02 ($77.10 at the forecast 
peak), would have ranged from $15.50 to $39.63 in ninety percent of the hours in 2008, 
and averaged $29.38 over 2008 assuming that the wind output was 12% of potential 
capacity.  This is a very conservative worst-case scenario but in any hour the shift of the 
supply curve could be more dramatic than presented, as occasionally almost no wind 
power is present on the grid.  At maximum wind potential, the efficient market prices at the 
given loads would have ranged from $12.24 to $45.90/MWh ($59.76 at the forecast 
                                                          
14
 It is understood solar intermittency would have an impact as well, however, as shown by the generation shares 
in Table 1, wind is the primary source of intermittency since solar energy accounts for only a very small portion of 
RMPA generation through the study period.  
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maximum), would have ranged from $12.93 to $39.21 in ninety percent of the hours, and 
averaged $15.50 over the year.  These results, however, assume no congestion occurs on 
the transmission pathway between Nodes 1 and 2.  If congestion were to occur, the RMPA 
market would separate into two distinct markets, and a dispatch solution similar to that in 
shown in Figure 4 would be computed in each.  Power would flow along the transmission 
line from the node with the lower price to that with the higher price. The supply curve in 
the higher priced node would be composed of the residual supply curve from the other 
node up to the capacity of the transmission line, and the generator marginal costs located 
in that node.   
Hourly simulation solutions solve the simple problem illustrated in Figure 4 using 
estimated generator marginal costs, generator capacities for traditional generators, 
simulated wind capacities using weather data at each wind farm in the RMPA, actual RMPA 
demand data and actual transmission constraints hourly from 2008 to 2010.15  The hourly 
wind outcomes used in the simulations are summarized in Figure 5 and Tables 2 and 3.  
The RMPA included 28 windfarms in 21 separate locations during the 2008-2010 period.  
As noted in Tables 1 and 2, wind capacity grew over the simulation period.  Lacking data on 
exact start-up dates for new expansions, a plant was assumed to come online in the first 
hour of the month it began operation.  To model the wind at each plant location, the 
National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) Western Wind Dataset was used.16  This 
dataset models hourly wind patterns across the western United States based on 2004-2006 
                                                          
15
 The model also includes seasonal output cycles for hydro and solar power, and daily cycles for solar output to 
describe the estimated hourly output capacities of these sources. These were modeled using reported 10-year 
rolling average monthly generation data by facility from the US Bureau of Reclamation.  Missing stations were 
assumed to follow the same cycles as reported stations within their specific watershed.  Solar cycles were fitted 
using sunrise and sunset times defined by U.S. Naval Observatory Astronomical Applications Department data. 
16
 Information regarding this dataset can be found at NREL's Western Wind Dataset webpage portal. 
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data over 32,403 actual and potential windfarm locations in the western United States.  The 
meteorological model also accounts for and simulates spatial and temporal correlations 
across the region.  Data from the nearest locations modeled by NREL to each of the RMPA 
windfarms was used to simulate wind outcomes by farm.  The summary data in Table 2 
explains why wind resources are so valued, particularly in Wyoming.  The average capacity 
factor of all Wyoming sources in the simulation was 41.1% while in Colorado it was 
27.3%.17  Both wind areas have a strong seasonal component as well as a diurnal one. Both 
experience stronger winds and higher capacity factors in winter than summer months.  
Colorado wind tends to peak at night, while Wyoming wind often peaks in late afternoon.           
Hourly balancing-area load-data from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) Form 714 was used to define nodal demands.18 Since balancing areas do not 
correspond to the nodes defined in the simulations, it was assumed underlying demand is 
similar on a per-person basis in each node, and annual county-level census data from 2008-
2010 was used to define nodal demands as the population-weighted shares of the total 
load.  This leaves an asymmetric pair of markets with Node 2 accounting for approximately 
88% of total demand over the three-year period.  Demand patterns on a daily basis reflect a 
typical diurnal pattern, peaking in daylight hours, with clear shoulder periods in evening 
and mornings, and minimum demand occurring overnight.  Seasonal peaks occur in mid-
                                                          
17
 Capacity factor refers to actual power produced relative to the potential generation, or "nameplate" capacity.   
18
 FERC Form 714 data reports load by the two RMPA balancing areas controlled by Xcel Energy and the Western 
Area Power Administration (WAPA). As data is only reported for the Xcel Energy balancing area in 2008, the 
missing 2008 WAPA data was estimated using the hourly proportional load differences between areas in 2009 to 
create simulation data in the missing area for 2008. These estimates were then added to the reported data in 2008 
to create an estimate of total hourly load.  This data was then compared to data published in Beck (2009) 
describing average, maximum, minimum, 5% and 95% load levels.  The constructed data overstated the reported 
average, maximum and minimum loads by approximately 5.2% and was deflated by this amount.  Resultant 
estimates of hourly load at the 5% and 95% levels differed by less than 2% from those in Beck (2009) and were 
used as proxies for actual 2008 hourly load outcomes.         
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summer, with a secondary peak in mid-winter.  The data may also contain an economic 
cycle, with average load falling during the 2008-2009 national recession. Hourly demands 
are treated as perfectly inelastic and exogenous in the simulation model, as almost all 
residential and commercial demand in the region does not have real-time metering, nor are 
instantaneous spot prices posted or charged.  The three-year demand pattern is shown in 
Figure 5 and described in Table 3.   
The ability of the grid to maintain low generation costs depends on transmission 
constraints present on the grid.  Actual hourly transmission limits for Path 36/TOT3 in 
2008-2010 are also described in Figure 5 and Table 3.  While the nominal capacity of this 
link is 1605MW, its maximum rating in any given hour can vary depending on load and 
generation conditions, temperature and weather, maintenance operations and 
configuration changes, other transmission line conditions in the RMPA and reliability 
considerations.19 For these reasons the average capacity over the simulation period was 
1331 MW with a standard deviation of 173 MW.  Transmission rights across this link are 
determined by the ownership of the lines, which are both privately and publicly owned.  As 
of 2008, 71.4% of the capacity was owned by a consortium of utilities and agencies 
involved in the Missouri Basin Power Project and owners of the Laramie River Generating 
station in Wheatland, Wyoming, which can produce up to 1140 MW of power for the RMPA.  
The remaining Path 36/TOT3 capacity is held by Xcel Energy (3.7%) and the federally 
owned Western Area Power Administration (24.9%), which markets transmission rights 
on its share of the link. 
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 Some reserve is usually maintained to ensure that if a failure occurred elsewhere on the system, resulting 
changes in power-flows could be accommodated.   
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Results: 
 Electricity price outcomes are solved using the dispatch model and incorporating 
actual RMPA demand (load) and transmission constraints, estimated generation costs, and 
wind conditions over the 26,304 hours simulating Jan 1, 2008 at 12:00 am to December 31, 
2010 at 11:00 pm.  The simulation was programmed using GAMS.20 A simulated 
unconstrained transmission solution in which no transmission capacity constraint was 
imposed between Nodes 1 and 2 was also computed to determine the impact of 
transmission constraints on the system. Results were also used to consider the effects of 
wind intermittency and increased capacity on power prices and transmission congestion, 
and to construct an estimate of congestion rents created by inadequate transmission 
capacity between the two nodal markets.  A summary of the computed market price 
outcomes is presented in Table 4.   
Price results indicate the effects of congestion on the grid, consistent with Equation 
(7).  When the transmission constraint is not binding a single market clearing price occurs 
across Nodes 1 and 2. We define the price differential here as the Node 2 price less the 
price in Node 1 in any period.  In the simulations reported here it was always the case that 
congestion occurred as power flowed north to south (from Node 1 to Node 2) and never 
occurred due to power flowing in the opposite direction, thus price differentials observed 
were never negative.  This occurred because of the relatively low generation costs in Node 
1 relative to those in Node 2 and the large generation capacity relative to demand in Node 
1.  These results also reflect the evolution of power development in the RMPA where 
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 General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS), GAMS Development Corporation (www.gams.com).  Code and data 
are available upon request from the authors. 
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historically power generation facilities have been built not only to serve the Wyoming 
market (Node 1) but also to exploit the low cost of fuel in Wyoming to export power to the 
Colorado market.  In contrast, historically Colorado power generation has been built to 
serve the Colorado market, particularly demand in the Front Range region where the 
majority of the RMPA population is located.   
Comparison of the efficient results to the results using the actual Path 36/TOT3 
transmission limits shows the constraint causes average prices in Node 1 to fall and Node 2 
to rise relative to the unconstrained case, as expected if power flows from north to south 
along the transmission link.  The impact of the constraint appears to increase over time as 
the average price differential increases in each year, as does the standard deviation of 
prices in Node 1 and for the price differential.  Node 2 prices fall on average throughout the 
simulation.  Despite the fact that, all else equal, congestion should raise price in the 
downstream node relative to the unconstrained outcome, the increase in the amount of 
cheaper wind energy available in Node 1 over the simulation period both creates 
transmission congestion, which has the effect of raising Node 2 prices, and reduces the cost 
of power exported from Node 1, potentially reducing costs in Node 2.  In the unconstrained 
transmission simulation the removal of the first effect (congestion) is clear as the 
availability of increased low-cost wind energy over time reduces average power prices.          
The change in congestion over time can also be seen by comparing annual price 
differentials in the results.  Figure 6 shows the duration of price differentials expressed as a 
percentage of the total hours in each year of the simulation.  Price differentials of a penny 
or more between the nodal markets occur in only 1.8% of the hours in 2008, but this rises 
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to 13.2% of hours in 2009 and 56.6% in 2010.  Additionally the maximum price differential 
increases from $32.51 in 2008 to $36.32 in 2010, while average price differentials increase 
from $0.29 to $11.18.  While the incidence of congestion will always occur more often when 
transmission capacity is reduced, as growth in wind capacity occurred in Node 1 the 
transmission capacity constraint appears binding in significantly more hours regardless of 
the constraint level.         
To quantify this impact, a hurdle regression model was used to determine the 
relationships between demand, transmission capacity and the levels of wind generation 
available in Nodes 1 and 2 on congestion and price differential outcomes.  These results are 
shown in Table 5 noting all variables are measured in megawatts (MW).  The first stage of 
the model was run as a Probit regression to quantify the relationship in the simulation data 
between total load (demand), transmission capacity, wind output in both nodes, hydro 
output from Node 1 and the incidence of transmission congestion.  All else equal, greater 
total load causes greater demand in Node 1, which reduces the amount of power available 
for export and the potential for transmission congestion. Greater transmission capacity will 
also reduce incidences of congestion.  One would expect that since wind is unpredictable 
but nearly free when available, greater wind output in Node 1 will increase congestion by 
making more cheap power available for export to Node 2.  Increased wind in Node 2, 
however, will lessen the demand for Node 1 power.  Efficient dispatch would use this 
energy first in Node 2 given it is cheaper than any exported power from Node 1 (it incurs 
no transmission costs since it is located in Node 2 and generation costs at each wind 
location are assumed equal), which in turn would reduce congestion.  Hydro output in 
Node 1 is also included in the regression as it is also a very cheap source of power, and 
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when more power is available, especially in the spring run-off months, more power is 
available for export to Node 2, increasing the potential for congestion.21 The results are 
shown in Table 5a.22  As expected all variables are of expected sign.  Regression results 
suggest the marginal effects of transmission constraints and wind output in Node 1 are 
much larger (often depending on the year an order of magnitude greater) than demand 
changes or wind output changes in Node 2, while hydro effects are very similar to those of 
wind in Node 1 suggesting these are the primary determinants of transmission congestion.     
Conditional on the transmission congestion occurring, the magnitude of the price 
differential was then explored using a truncated regression to quantify its relationship with 
load (demand), transmission constraints, and the levels of Node 2 wind and hydropower 
output.  Results are described in Table 5b.  All else equal, one would expect that growth in 
hourly demand Node 2 to increase Node 2 prices and the price differential when congestion 
occurred.  In contrast, greater transmission capacity and therefore greater imports should 
reduce the price differential by shifting supply outward of power outward, thereby 
lowering prices.  Node 2 wind and hydropower output should also have the same effect on 
the supply curve and price differentials.  Again all signs are as expected and the magnitudes 
of the effects of each determinant broadly similar.  Over the 2008-2010 period, on average 
a 100 MW increase in transmission capacity during a period of congestion decreased the 
price differential by approximately $0.82. The same increase in Node 2 wind or 
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 Since in an efficient dispatch with congestion power is always used in each node to first satisfy nodal load and 
then for export, most exported power from Node 1 to Node 2 is coal power.  Greater wind and hydropower 
availability increase the use of this power in Node 1, making more coal generation available for export to Node 2.  
Since Node 1 coal power is cheaper than most power generation in Node 2, this exported power is always used if 
available.  
22
 Node 2 Hydro output was not included in the regression due to very high correlation between Node 1 and Node 
2 Hydro output (watersheds are shared in some cases, and seasonal snowmelt leads to very similar water flow 
patterns) and multicollinearity concerns.  
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hydropower output decreased the price differential by $0.57 , while an increase in load of 
100 MW during a period of congestion increased the price differential by $0.54.        
To quantify the cost of increased congestion caused primarily by additional wind 
capacity and inadequate transmission capacity, congestion rents were also determined.  
These rents were computed as the value of the exported flows from Node 1 to Node 2 given 
the price differential in that hour.  For example, if 1300 MW of electricity were exported 
from Node 1 to Node 2 in a given hour and the price differential between these two areas 
was $10.00, the "rents" accruing to exporters of power from Node 1 to Node 2 would be 
$13,000.  This represents the additional profit created by selling power in Node 2 instead 
of Node 1 or the total rents from holding transmission rights during this period of 
congestion. These form our estimate of the potential benefit of additional transmission 
capacity under efficient market conditions.23  To determine the amount of capacity 
necessary to avoid these rents, simulations were run increasing the available transmission 
capacity in each hour by 100 MW increments up to 1000 MW.   Table 6 describes the total 
congestion rents occurring in each year for the actual hourly transmission limits, and what 
would have occurred had each of those hourly limits been increased by 100 MW up to an 
additional 1000MW in each year.  In addition, the total avoided rents or marginal benefits 
of these increases over the entire three year period are also tabulated.   
Computed results in the first row of Table 6 show the increase in congestion rents 
accruing to transmission rights holders under the actual transmission limits as incidences 
of congestion increased over time.  Again, these incidences appear to have been driven 
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 Actual benefits in the RMPA are potentially higher given the fact that the wholesale market is not organized as a 
competitive auction but instead relies on bilateral agreements between utility providers and power generators.  
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primarily by the additional generation capacity installed on the grid, particularly wind in 
Node 1.24  The estimated value of total rents accrued over the three simulated years was 
over $149.1 million.  As shown in Table 6, a relatively small addition of transmission 
capacity could have significantly reduced total congestion rents in any year, with the first 
100 MW potentially avoiding over 31.5 percent of the total rents generated in the three 
years, and over 53.1 percent of the total rents generated in the years 2008 and 2009 
respectively.  In the first two years of the simulation an additional 300 and 600 MW of 
capacity would have eliminated all congestion rents, while an increase of 1000 MW would 
have been necessary to eliminate all rents in 2010.         
Analysis of the distribution of estimated rents and how they change reveals how the 
price and quantity changes in the market affect specific generator’s revenues, especially in 
the presence of transmission congestion.  Referring to the actual ownership shares of 
transmission rights over the Path 36/TOT3 link referred to earlier, one coal-fired 
generating station (the Laramie River Station) could earn an estimated $105.9 million 
(71.4%) share of the total congestion rents estimated to be generated here.25  Just over 
$37.1 million (24.9%) of the total congestion rents could be earned from users of the 
transmission rights marketed by the Western Area Power Administration’s (WAPA) to 
other producers in Node 1.  The largest utility in Node 2, Xcel Energy would be estimated to 
receive a $5.5 million (3.7%) share of these rents.   
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 Table 1 reports 1006 MW of additional coal and gas-fired generation came online in 2008-2010.  Only 185MW 
was added in Node 1, thus little of this new capacity would have added to congestion given power flowed mainly 
from north to south (Node 1 to Node 2) in the simulations.     
25
 Simulation results indicate that the Laramie River Station would only earn $69.1 million from rents due to 
exports to Node 2. The efficient dispatch would allocate some of this plant’s production to Node 1, leaving it 
unable to use its entire transmission rights allocation.  If the plant were to sell its excess transmission rights to 
other firms in Node 1 it could potentially capture the rents available, thus the actual rents accruing to the firm 
would likely be between $69.1 million and $105.9 million.     
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A further analysis of rents accruing to all producers in Nodes 1 and 2 is presented in 
Table 7.  The presence of congestion and the impacts this has on prices in each node are 
clear from comparison of profits for generators in Nodes 1 and 2 under the simulations 
using actual hourly transmission limits, and those that could occur if such constraints were 
not present.  In Node 1, 7.8 percent of potential profits are lost due to congestion and the 
resultant lower prices in that node, costing over $96 million over the three years of the 
simulation.  Node 2 producers reap the benefit of the higher prices the congestion causes, 
which causes total profits to rise by over $52 million, or 1.9 percent relative to outcomes 
had no transmission congestion occurred over the three years.   
Wind producers are even more affected than the general market in Node 1 by profit 
losses due to congestion effects.  Because of the cost-minimizing dispatch that is assumed 
to occur in each node, wind power is almost always sold in the node it is produced.  For 
Node 1 producers, very seldom is there a surplus of power available for export after such 
dispatch occurs thus they earn very little rents.  As wind capacity increases in Node 1 this 
pushes coal-fired generation up the supply curve and closer to the margin, and contrary to 
what might be expected, this actually can benefit some coal-producers as it allows them to 
export more of their power. In times of congestion this allows coal-fired producers to earn 
most of the congestion rents available.   The result is improved profitability for the coal-
generation sector over what it would have been without such rents.   
Wind producers in Node 1 have the opposite experience. As their power production 
rises over time, it causes more congestion on the grid and prices fall in Node 1, lowering 
wind-producer’s profitability.  In effect, windier conditions, causing greater wind 
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production costs wind producers while benefiting coal producers.  Wind profits are 29% 
lower than they would be in the absence of congestion, and wind producers suffer over 71 
percent of the total profit loss experienced in the Node 1 due to congestion effects. Most of 
the remainder of the profit loss in Node 1, particularly in the last year of the simulation is 
experienced by hydro-electric producers.26  While some coal plants can experience profit 
loss due to lower prices in Node 1 caused by congestion , as a sector, coal-generation in 
Node 1 becomes the primary export power source when congestion occurs and actually 
experiences increased profits due to that congestion. 27 Node 2 wind producers benefit 
from the congestion caused by abundant and low-cost production in Node 1.  Their profits 
over the entire simulation rise by over 15 percent relative to simulations without a 
transmission constraint, accounting for 73 percent of the total profit increase in that node.   
Discussion of Results   
The impact of the additional wind output in our simulated RMPA markets is 
dramatic when transmission congestion occurs.  Congestion caused by additional wind 
energy causes regional market prices to diverge, sometimes significantly from those that 
would occur in uncongested circumstances.  Price results presented in Table 4 for the 
RMPA simulations suggest the greatest impact occurs in Node 1 where prices fall due to the 
stranded wind power flooding the local market and driving wholesale prices downward.  
While it may seem initially counter-intuitive, additional wind energy arriving on the grid is 
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 Hydroelectric generation accounts for 290.1 MW of potential power in Node 1 and collectively defines the next 
step on the supply curve above wind generators.  Coal generators are collectively grouped in the next portion of 
the supply curve in Node 1, and are the marginal generation type in most hours.     
27
 Recall that Node 1 coal-generator costs are much lower than those in Colorado due to their location to nearby 
coal-mines.  This results in exported power from Wyoming always being dispatched in Colorado when it is 
available.    
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not necessarily a benefit to wind producers as the price decreases caused in Node 1 by 
congestion can eliminate much of the additional profits the additional power might create.   
Further, traditional fossil-fuel power producers are displaced in the dispatch queue 
by sudden and unpredicted increases in wind power.  Such conditions might be expected to 
lower the profits to these firms if their generated power were dispatched in Node 1 due to 
the lower prices caused by the additional wind power and the reduced need for coal-fired 
power output when wind power increases, but this may not happen.   Our simulations 
show that if these coal-fired plants have transmission rights, exporting their power to 
neighboring markets where prices due to congestion become higher can allow them to 
offset such losses and actually benefit from the presence of wind-generators.  Overall then, 
the addition of unpredictable wind resources in a transmission constrained area such as 
Wyoming can have the effect of lowering returns to capital for wind producers relative 
uncongested transmission conditions, while having an ambiguous effect on higher-cost 
traditional generators.28  Downstream of the congestion the effect is the opposite.  
Congestion has the effect of raising profits over what they would have been without 
congestion.  The effect to consumers in the downstream market would likely be 
unambiguous; customers whose utilities were forced to pay higher wholesale prices than 
would occur in the absence of congestion would face higher prices.      
The impact of congestion on power market outcomes also may not create price 
incentives for the creation of additional transmission capacity.  In the results presented, the 
estimated additional capacity needed to avoid congestion is over approximately 900 MW 
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 In a rate of return regulated utility market, this could also stop any reduced wholesale power-rates from being 
passed on to consumers in the area where price has fallen.  If the utility also owned the wind generation, to ensure 
adequate capital return consumer prices may not be allowed to fall to maintain the utility's rate or return on its 
wind investments.     
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by the end of the simulation.  While transmission expansion costs vary by location, the 
Wyoming Infrastructure Authority estimates the cost of an 800-900 MW expansion of the 
Path 36/TOT3 line modeled to be less than $300 million.29 Simulated Node 1 price and 
profit outcomes suggest that wind generators have little incentive to provide additional 
transmission capacity to Node 2.  Node 1 wind producers’ lost profits over the three year 
simulation total $69.3 million, suggesting the payoff time to such an investment could be 
decades.  Further, wind generators are owned by multiple firms suggesting that 
coordination for such an investment could be difficult and free-riding incentives could 
undermine any such effort.  Ironically, increases in wind output seem to create the greatest 
benefits in Node 1 to fossil-fuel generators with transmission rights to Node 2 thus they 
would have little incentive to invest in additional capacity.30   
In Node 2, increases in transmission capacity would create losses for wind 
producers thus they have no interest in such investment (short of accessing another 
market for special non-qualified facility arrangements).31   Transmission congestion 
shelters these producers from competition with wind producers in Node 1 and any 
reduction in congestion would eliminate the price increases that drive their additional 
profit in the simulations presented.  Other Node 2 power producers would similarly not be 
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 See the Wyoming Infrastructure Authority Wyoming-Colorado Intertie (WCI) project website. 
30
 This non-intuitive result occurs because an increase in wind output in Node 1 shifts the dispatch curve right, 
displacing power coal production in Node 1. Coal producers, however, are the marginal producers in the optimal 
dispatch for Node 1 and therefore generate the power exported to Node 2.  When increases in wind output cause 
transmission congestion, these exporting companies sell more power in Node 2 (assuming they have transmission 
rights to do so) and the exporters' increase in profits due to the transmission congestion-caused price differential 
between Nodes 1 and 2 more than makes up for the loss in generation sales in Node 1 caused by the greater 
abundance of lower cost wind. 
31
 There still could be some incentive for special bilateral supply contracts to be made with other regions in the 
western grid that could create incentives for transmission investment.  We cannot quantify those in our region-
specific simulation.   
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interested in financing additional transmission expansion as it would only increase the 
competition they would face from lower-cost Wyoming producers.  Third-party 
transmission companies may also not be willing to invest in additional transmission 
capacity for the same reasons - doing so would reduce the rents and potential profits of 
building more lines.   
Comparing the predicted simulation outcomes and implied incentives to actual 
development in the RMPA suggests the results are consistent with the observed pattern of 
development that has occurred in the region.  Initially wind resources were exploited in 
Colorado nearest the major load center in the area (the City of Denver and the Colorado 
Front Range).  While Wyoming’s wind resources were known to be superior in quality to 
those in Colorado they were initially developed slowly.  By the mid-2000s however, these 
resources began to be developed quickly by several large power companies.  Development 
of the wind potential appears to have contributed to transmission congestion by 2010 in 
the area, with the result that lower prices in Wyoming (Node 1) drove down potential rates 
of return to these new investments, while raising prices over what would otherwise have 
been expected in the absence of congestion in Node 2 (Colorado).   While lower rates of 
return may not necessarily cause consumer electricity rates to rise, PacifiCorp did request 
rate increases in its Rocky Mountain Power service area in Wyoming during this time.  The 
primary impact, however, of the increased congestion and its effects on prices and profits 
appears to have been in halting wind development in Wyoming.  No new wind generation 
development of any kind has occurred in the Wyoming portion of the RMPA since 2010.  
Simulation results here suggest that was the year congestion impacts became critical.   
31 
 
In Wyoming, concerns over congestion have spurred the state government’s 
Wyoming Infrastructure Authority (WIA) to engage in transmission development.  The 
stated goal of the WIA was to encourage development of Wyoming’s electricity resources, 
including wind.32  It was understood that without additional transmission capacity to move 
the power to market such development may not occur.  The first major transmission 
project the WIA will complete is an 800-900 MW expansion of the Path 36/TOT3 
transmission link to Colorado, at an estimated cost of between $200 and $300 million.  The 
proposed line is currently under construction and planned to be in operation by summer 
2014.  The simulations presented here suggest the size of expansion will nearly eliminate 
congestion that would occur under efficient dispatch conditions.  The WIA also has been 
active in developing additional transmission capacity between Wyoming and Colorado.  
Other efforts have focused on transmission expansion westward to allow wind resources to 
have transmission access to western markets such as California and the Pacific Northwest.  
Due to planned renewable portfolio standards being implemented in these regions, both 
areas are expected to have significant demand for wind power, and wind resources in 
Wyoming with their high capacity factors and favorable peak output cycles could be a very 
lucrative location for generation.33  
Conclusions:  
This paper has presented a framework for modeling electricity dispatch, with a 
specific application to the Rocky Mountain Power Area.  Specific data sources required to 
model such an area have been identified, and a method of estimating proprietary 
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 Wyoming would also like to see additional fossil-fired fired generation created in the state to export power.  
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 In November 2012, Federal permits were granted for the largest wind farm in the United States to be built in 
central Wyoming (the Chokecherry-Sierra Madre project).  The first phase will have a capacity of over 1000 MW. 
Completion of the project is expected to occur when transmission capacity becomes available.   
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production costs has been outlined.  The outcomes were simulated in efficient as well as 
transmission constrained conditions.  Results indicate that the market effects caused by 
changes in wind power and other intermittent sources are dependent on the demand 
conditions in the market and the presence of transmission constraints.  The outcomes may 
not always be as one might expect intuitively due to market imperfections causing 
outcomes to depart from first-best conditions. Efficiency outcomes in the presence of 
second-best market conditions may not always be predictable.  Electricity markets are 
bound to be distorted by such market imperfections.  Output is not storable, markets 
include constraints to output and transmission, and rights to use portions of the grid may 
not be distributed in a manner that ensures efficiency.  Accounting for such problems is 
necessary if economics is to be useful in making informed policy decisions regarding 
electricity grid development.     
The simulations presented here demonstrate the club-good aspects of transmission 
capacity.  As a club-good, transmission capacity is excludable but non-rivalrous until 
congestion occurs.   Because the incentives to create additional transmission capacity may 
be weak, transmission may be privately provided at a level that is socially inefficient.  This 
could eliminate incentives to develop otherwise high-quality power resources if the 
location of such resources is distant from adequate transmission capacity and suggests a 
possible role for public involvement in transmission provision.  Finally, the analysis above 
suggests that any policies that effect power pricing are not easily predicted in a market that 
is distorted by technical constraints such as transmission capacity limits.  Market outcomes 
in such circumstances cannot be assumed to be efficient and therefore costs and benefits of 
policy changes (carbon taxes, regional renewable portfolio standards, endangered species 
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protections that affect electrical generation or transmission development, wind production 
taxes, or coal severance taxes) that have an impact on electricity production costs may not 
be straightforward to predict.  Similarly it is important to assess the resulting winners and 
losers for any policy change – as demonstrated here, renewable energy expansion may 
benefit the traditional sources it is meant to displace.  The results presented here suggest 
that if society desires more renewable energy sources to be developed, efforts may require 
more than production subsidies to be employed.  Such development may need to focus on 
other impediments such as transmission congestion.               
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Figure 1:  The RMPA within the Western Interconnect. 
                    
Source:   North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC).   
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Figure 2:  RMPA Transmission System including Major Power-flow Pathways   
 
 
 
Source:  NTTG Website with modifications made to show major transmission pathways.   
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Figure 3:  Simplified Nodal Network with Simulation Parameters.   
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Figure 4:  RMPA-wide Estimated 2008 Supply Curve assuming no Congestion 
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Figure 5:  Total RMPA Hourly Wind Output, Load and Transmission Capacity  
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Figure 6:   Percentage of Hours of Congestion by Year 
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Table 1:  RMPA Electricity Generation by Power Source (2008) 
Power Source  Total 
Nameplate 
Capacity 
(2008) 
% of 
Potential 
Total 
Capacity 
(2008) 
Average Age 
of 
Generating 
Sources 
(2008) 
Change in 
Capacity 
2008-2010 
% Change 
in 
Capacity 
2008-
2010  
Regular 
Generation: 
      
Coal  Bituminous 1,982.9 MW 11.9% 43 years -72.7 MW -3.7% 
 Sub-
bituminous 
4,742.8 MW 28.5% 37 years 881 MW 18.6% 
 Total Coal: 
 
6,725.7 MW 40.4% 39.9 years 808.3 MW 12.0% 
Natural Gas  6,784.1 MW 40.7% 15 years 198 MW 2.9% 
Hydro Pumped 
Storage 
508.5 MW 3.1% 38.4 years 0 0% 
 Hydro 930.3 MW  5.6% 54.6 years 0 0% 
 Total 
Hydro: 
 
1,438.8 MW 8.6% 52.9 years 0 0% 
Petroleum   
 
36.4 MW 0.2% 40 years 0 0% 
Renewable 
Gases 
 10.2 MW >0.1% 3.7 years 0 0% 
Wind   1460.7 MW 8.8% 6.7 years 963.4 MW 66% 
Solar 
 
 11.7 MW >0.1% 1.3 years 56.8 MW 485.4% 
Total Potential 
Regular 
Generation: 
 16,457.6 MW 98.8% 27.8 years 2,026.5 MW 12.3% 
Source:  EIA Data, for 2008 to 2010 reporting years.     
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Table 2:  Wind Farm Capacities, Capacity Factors and Locations 
Plant Name (Company) 
 
Capacity 
(MW) 
Year/Month 
Opened 
Capacity 
Factor 
NREL 
Location ID 
 Node 1 
      Medicine Bow (Platte River Power) 
 
8.6 1996-2005 41.4% 18519 
 Foote Creek (AES SeaWest) 
 
84.8 1999-2000 47.1% 16563 
 Rock River (AES SeaWest) 
 
50 2001 46.5% 31422 
 Happy Jack (Duke) 
 
29.4 2008/8 34.8% 14318 
 Seven Mile Hill (PacifiCorp) 
 
123.6 2008/12 40.1% 18627 
 Glenrock I (PacifiCorp) 
 
99 2008/12 33.4% 23909 
 Glenrock II (PacifiCorp) 
 
39 2009/1 32.6% 23909 
 Rolling Hills (PacifiCorp) 
 
99 2009/1 32.6% 23909 
 High Plains (PacifiCorp) 
 
99 2009/9 39.8% 16676 
 McFadden (PacifiCorp) 
 
28.5 2009/10 39.8% 16676 
 Silver Sage (Duke) 
 
42 2009/10 35.2% 14318 
 Campbell Hill (Duke) 
 
99 2009/12 31.4% 23835 
 Casper Wind Farm (Chevron) 
 
17 2009/12 31.4% 23835 
 Dunlap (PacifiCorp) 
 
111 2010/10 34.6% 19280 
 Top of the World (Duke) 
 
200 2010/10 35.6% 23389 
 Node 1 Total (end of 2010) 
 
1129.9 
    Average Capacity Factor* 
   
41.1% 
  Standard Deviation 
   
32.7% 
  Node 2 
      Ponnequinn (Xcel) 
 
31.6 1998-2001 25.8% 13661 
 Ridge Creek (Enxco) 
 
29.7 2001 25.4% 13547 
 Colorado Green Holdings (PPM) 
 
162 2003 33.6% 31007 
 Lamar (City of Lamar) 
 
6 2004 25.1% 31053 
 Spring Canyon (Invenergy) 
 
60 2006 24.9% 13462 
 Cedar Creek (Babcock & Brown) 
 
300.5 2007 26.5% 13282 
 Logan (Logan Wind) 
 
201 2007 26.4% 13667 
 Twin Buttes (PPM) 
 
75 2007 33.6% 30973 
 Peetz Table (FPL Peetz) 
 
199.5 2007 26.4% 13667 
 Northern Colorado (Northern CO Wind) 
 
174.3 2009/8 26.7% 13667 
 DOE Golden (NREL) 
 
3.8 2010/1 19.4% 11949 
 Vestas Towers (Vestas) 
 
1.8 2010/4 21.4% 9981 
 Kit Carson (Duke)  
 
51 2010/11 30.9% 10928 
 Node 2 Total (end of 2010) 
 
1296.2 
    Average Capacity Factor* 
   
27.3% 
  Standard Deviation 
   
23.3% 
  Capacity Factor Correlation - Node1 - Node2 (2008-2010):  
 
0.403 
  * Actual simulated average over entire node, weighted for power output and new plant openings 
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 Table 3:  Simulation Parameter Summary 
 
 
Year 
Demand 
(load) MW 
Path 
36/TOT3 
Limit (MW) 
Total Wind 
Output 
(MW) 
Node 1  
Wind 
Output 
(MW) 
Node 2 
Wind 
Output 
(MW) 
       Maximum 2008 11562.7 1510.4 1433.4 393.0 1057.9 
 
2009 11007.6 1516.9 2019.6 812.9 1232.8 
 
2010 11736.6 1680.0 2384.7 1121.5 1284.5 
 
2008-2010 11736.6 1680.0 2384.7 1121.5 1284.5 
       Minimum 2008 5305.8 702.8 0.3 0 0 
 
2009 5154.7 337.3 0.2 0 0 
 
2010 5540.9 783.9 0.2 0 0 
 
2008-2010 5154.7 337.3 0.2 0 0 
       Average 2008 7424.8 1321.3 371.3 81.6 289.7 
 
2009 7481.7 1309.2 548.7 235.5 313.2 
 
2010 7690.5 1363.2 717.2 355.6 361.5 
 
2008-2010 7532.2 1331.2 545.6 224.1 321.4 
       Std. dev 2008 1039.4 154.8 296.7 85.5 257.8 
 
2009 993.7 192.2 436.1 207.2 299.3 
 
2010 1065.0 165.6 531.0 304.1 329.5 
 
2008-2010 1039.4 173.1 454.5 245.2 298.5 
       5th 
Percentile 2008 5910 1000 33 1 14 
limit 2009 5798 868 54 8 14 
 
2010 6105 1123 61 16 14 
 
2008-2010 5965 1043 48 3 15 
       95th 
Percentile 2008 9400 1457 998 275 845 
limit 2009 9289 1504 1140 481 812 
 
2010 9675 1559 1715 967 1040 
 
2008-2010 9440 1535 1528 761 963 
 
  
44 
 
Table 4:  Summary of Computed Price Outcomes  
  
Node 1 
Prices 
(MWh) 
Node2 Prices 
(MWh) 
Price 
Differential 
(MWh) 
Unconstrained 
Transmission 
Price (MWh) 
      Average Price 
     
 
2008 $37.33 $37.62 $0.29 $37.61 
 
2009 $33.54 $35.81 $2.26 $35.68 
 
2010 $21.60 $32.84 $11.18 $31.70 
 
2008-2010 $30.85 $35.42 $4.57 $35.00 
      Std. Deviation 
     
 
2008 $9.45 $8.98 $2.25 $8.99 
 
2009 $10.87 $8.15 $6.11 $8.24 
 
2010 $14.77 $8.03 $10.68 $8.92 
 
2008-2010 $13.65 $8.63 $8.63 $9.06 
      Maximum 
     
 
2008 $77.09 $77.09 $32.51 $77.09 
 
2009 $77.07 $77.07 $32.46 $77.07 
 
2010 $68.99 $68.99 $36.32 $68.99 
 
2008-2010 $77.09 $77.09 $36.32 $77.09 
      Minimum  
     
 
2008 $12.98 $15.50 $0.00 $15.50 
 
2009 $13.03 $13.03 $0.00 $13.03 
 
2010 $9.28 $13.39 $0.00 $12.24 
 
2008-2010 $9.28 $13.03 $0.00 $12.24 
      5th Percentile 
limit 
     
 
2008 $29.17 $29.17 $0.00 $29.17 
 
2009 $13.03 $25.79 $0.00 $25.79 
 
2010 $9.33 $16.25 $0.00 $15.60 
 
2008-2010 $9.33 $25.85 $0.00 $23.99 
      95th Percentile  
limit 
    
 
2008 $58.25 $58.25 $0.00 $58.25 
 
2009 $45.99 $45.99 $16.73 $45.99 
 
2010 $45.65 $45.65 $30.15 $45.65 
 
2008-2010 $46.07 $46.07 $21.11 $46.07 
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Table 5a:  Probit Estimates of Congestion Determinants 
Dependent Variable: 
Price Differential 
 
All Hours 
(2008-2010) 2008 2009 2010 
Total Load Coefficient -0.0015407 -0.0047955 -0.0039717 -0.0017803 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.000033 0.000556 0.0005399 0.0000489 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Transmission Capacity Coefficient -0.0098175 -0.0378671 -0.0346624 -0.0092874 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.0002025 0.0040369 0.0046121 0.0002608 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Node 1 Wind Output Coefficient 0.0136629 0.0411695 0.0352191 0.0117419 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.0002477 0.0052508 0.0049814 0.0003061 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Node 2 Wind Output Coefficient -0.0006828 -0.0008686 -0.001156 -0.0004996 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.0000595 0.0006584 0.0002654 0.000076 
 
p-value 0.000 0.187 0.000 0.000 
Node 1 Hydro Output Coefficient 0.0144296 0.0524094 0.0293363 0.0090719 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.0005027 0.0075634 0.004944 0.0007242 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Constant Coefficient 15.6064 55.72214 50.606 18.77937 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.323821 5.89912 6.63975 0.5493164 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 
Wald chi-squared (5)  3139.36 113.93 93.63 1804.98 
 
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Pseudo R-squared 0.7742 0.9177 0.8735 0.7138 
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Table 5b: Truncated OLS Regression of Positive Price Differentials 
Dependent Variable: 
Price Differential 
 
All Hours 
(2008-2010) 2008 2009 2010 
Total Load Coefficient 0.0054379 0.0039344 0.0053526 0.0050703 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.0000603 0.0003766 0.0000965 0.0000708 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Transmission Capacity Coefficient -0.0082047 -0.0110561 -0.0084254 -0.0138304 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.0002281 0.001503 0.0004161 0.0003006 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Node 2 Wind Output Coefficient -0.0056763 -0.0047398 -0.006331 -0.0056277 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.000143 0.0011341 0.000241 0.0001542 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Node 2 Hydro Output Coefficient -0.0056856 -0.0101016 -0.0078234 -0.0074635 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.0003539 0.0017091 0.0004895 0.0004073 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Constant Coefficient -5.401459 5.168447 -5.723182 5.609197 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.444772 2.967406 0.8628977 0.5868417 
 
p-value 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.000 
sigma Coefficient 3.350332 2.376014 2.237626 3.239331 
 
Robust Std. Error 0.0276274 0.1639854 0.0460698 0.0327519 
 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      
 
Wald chi-squared (4)  8838.66 210.79 5377.18 6839.39 
 
Prob > chi-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 6:  Congestion Rents: Simulations for Incremental Transmission Increases 
 
Total 
Congestion 
Rents (2008) 
Total 
Congestion 
Rents (2009) 
Total 
Congestion 
Rents (2010) 
Marginal Benefit over 
3-year period 
Actual Transmission Capacity  $2,251,141 $19,948,045 $126,914,043  
Additional 100MW $968,154 $9,441,329 $92,975,861 $45,727,884 
Additional 200MW $193,400 $4,112,338 $64,390,727 $34,688,879 
Additional 300MW $0 $1,424,746 $41,316,304 $25,955,415 
Additional 400MW $0 $357,367 $21,280,007 $21,103,676 
Additional 500MW $0 $67,018 $9,357,024 $12,213,333 
Additional 600MW $0 $0 $3,581,945 $5,842,097 
Additional 700MW $0 $0 $1,084,004 $2,497,942 
Additional 800MW $0 $0 $334,200 $749,804 
Additional 900MW $0 $0 $69,159 $265,041 
Additional 1000MW $0 $0 $0 $69,159 
   Total $149,113,228  
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Table 7:  Estimated Profits by Generators in Nodes 1 and 2 
  Node 1 Profits (total) Node 2 Profits (total) 
Actual Case    
 2008 $369,438,674 $992,190,907 
 2009 $387,649,645 $942,910,259 
 2010 $378,491,442 $840,323,561 
 2008-2010 $1,135,579,760 $2,775,424,726 
    
No Transmission 
Constraints    
 2008 $371,493,432 $991,850,261 
 2009 $404,254,839 $937,530,337 
 2010 $456,648,200 $793,389,245 
 2008-2010 $1,232,396,471 $2,722,769,843 
    
  
Wind Producer 
Profits (Node 1) 
Wind Producer 
Profits (Node 2) 
Actual Case    
 2008 $23,822,042 $80,804,393 
 2009 $78,487,190 $76,351,548 
 2010 $66,987,385 $50,596,414 
 2008-2010 $169,296,617 $207,752,355 
    
No Transmission 
Constraints    
 2008 $24,246,188 $81,361,823 
 2009 $85,741,020 $81,554,604 
 2010 $128,606,171 $83,517,599 
 2008-2010 $238,593,378 $246,434,026 
    
Wind Profit % of Total 
  Actual Case 
   
 
2008 6.5% 8.1% 
 
2009 20.3% 8.1% 
 
2010 17.7% 6.0% 
 
2008-2010 14.9% 7.5% 
    No Transmission 
Constraints 
   
 
2008 6.5% 8.2% 
 
2009 21.2% 8.7% 
 
2010 28.2% 10.5% 
 
2008-2010 19.4% 9.1% 
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Appendix:    Modeling Generator Marginal Costs:  
 
The most important determinants of generation production cost have been 
identified in the power engineering literature as the technology used in power production, 
the efficiency of that technology, and the fuel cost of the technology.   Critical information to 
estimate these three characteristics is available using US Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) Form 860 data, and while private information is not available to 
estimate costs statistically, the power-engineering literature includes known relationships 
from such studies that can be applied to approximate the potential costs conditions each 
generator faces.    
Estimates of marginal costs of production for this study utilize the following simple 
model.  Costs are expressed in price per megawatt hour of production (MWh).   All fuel 
costs are computed using the known conversion constant of MWh to btu equivalent. 
Generator fuel cost can then be computed by assuming a generator’s efficiency and the btu 
content of the fuel it uses.   Efficiencies assumed in this study use published engineering 
studies that detail typical plant efficiencies or “heat-rates” given technology and vintage 
and are detailed in Table 1A, as are the assumed energy contents of the fuels used, and 
assumed transport costs where applicable.  Fuel costs are the average 2007-2010 annual 
fuel costs by type reported by the EIA.34  Conversion factors used are described in Table 2A.   
For example, a bituminous coal-burning power plant with an assumed 30% 
efficiency would have the following estimated fuel cost: assuming one short-ton of 
                                                          
34
 Fuel costs reported by the EIA typically utilize reported market spot prices. Utilities and generating stations may 
purchase fuel using spot price contracts but more often negotiate contracts as long as 10-years to avoid energy 
price volatility. The nature of such contracts is not available publicly by generator thus average prices over the 
three-year period are used assuming that such contracts will include spot prices as part of the negotiated price.       
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bituminous coal contains 23,400,000 btu, at 100% efficiency in the conversion of coal 
energy content to electricity, one short-ton would create (23,400,000/3,412,141.63) = 
6.857863 MWh.  Assuming 30% plant efficiency reduces this electricity output to 2.057359 
MWh/short ton.  Assuming a market price of $42/short ton of bituminous coal in Colorado 
in late 2008 or early 2009 results in a marginal price of $20.41/MWh produced.   
This would be the estimated fuel cost if the plant were located at the mine (a mine-
mouth generator).  Since transport costs are a significant portion of fuel cost, and since coal 
is typically delivered by rail, using the reported EIA freight rates in Colorado for coal and an 
assumed distance to the mine, fuel prices can be adjusted to reflect transport cost.  For 
example, if the mine considered were located 215 miles from the source of coal it uses, and 
assuming the freight rate was $0.0655/ton-mile, the assumed fuel price would increase by 
$14.0825/ton and the marginal fuel cost would rise to approximately $27.48/MWh.  
Transportation costs here reflect EIA way-bill surveys to generators in the Colorado in 
2008-2010 and these are reported by the EIA publicly.35  Utility and power-plant power 
websites typically report location for the plant and the source of coal by mine thus typical 
shipping distances and costs can be accounted for in the estimation of generator fuel costs 
per MWh.  Estimation of generator marginal production costs should also include any other 
marginal cost of production and power delivery, including the variable portion of 
operations and maintenances costs (O&M) and transmission costs to bring the power to 
market as shown in Equation 1A.   
  
MC per MWh = fuel cost per MWh (including freight costs) + O&M per MWh + transmission per MWh. (1A) 
 
                                                          
35
 See The EIA waybill survey data at http://205.254.135.7/coal/transportationrates/ 
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All combustion fuel-powered generator marginal costs can be estimated using 
engineering estimates from the literature, though some will not include fuel transport costs 
and O&M costs differ by technology.36  Additionally efficiencies of some technologies 
change over time and this is also accounted for using plant age and published technology-
specific efficiency depreciation rates.   O&M cost estimates are reported in various 
generator studies and by the EIA (see references in Table 1A), and are assumed here by 
plant type based on the age and generation technology utilized.  Transmission costs can 
also be assumed by identifying plants that are distant from major electricity markets and 
the reported transmission tariffs charged in 2008 TO 2010.  In the RMPA region modeled 
here, transmission networks use “postage stamp” pricing in which a flat fee is charged per 
unit of power delivered, regardless of the distance the delivery requires.  Such information 
is available on WAPA an NTTG websites.37 
An alternative means of estimating generator fuel conversion efficiency, or “heat-
rates” is also available.  Monthly net heat rates can be found for many plants in the United 
States at the EPA eGrid database.38 Alternatively heat rates can be computed using EIA 
Form 923 data for electricity output and coal usage, although this data is reported on an 
annual basis.  The eGRid reported heat rates can be unrealistically high or low in any 
month, as can the computed heat rates using EIA data due possibly to measurement and 
reporting errors in fuel use or energy output.  Pratson, Haerer, and Patin o-Echeverri 
                                                          
36
 Gas power-plants were assumed to have fuel delivered by pipeline.  Local natural gas prices as reported by the 
EIA in the RMPA region were used to define the gas prices over the 2007-2010 period.  No freight cost was 
assumed between these prices and the delivered price as fuel delivery system costs were assumed to be sunk or 
fixed and not included in the price of fuel delivered.   
37
 Such tariffs are not distance dependent.  The rate was $3.75/MWh on both networks in 2008.   
38 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. eGRID; available from: http://www.epa.gov/cleanenergy/energy-
resources/egrid/index.html. 
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(2013) note this problem with respect to eGrid data and suggest using the median of 
monthly reported rates. Such a correction, however, is not available for EIA computed data 
given the annual nature of the data.  A drawback to using reported or computed heat rates 
is a lack of available data for some plants.  Due to both the problems of unreasonable 
computed heat rates, and missing plant data for generators in the study region reported 
here, power engineering efficiencies were used instead.   
Emission costs are another important source of plant variable costs.  Data for these 
costs can also be found at the EPA’s eGrid database.  For a recent example of a cost 
estimation using such data see Pratson, Haerer, and Patin o-Echeverri (2013).  Due to the 
fact that the eGrid database did not include data for all plants in the study region modeled 
in this study, such costs were not included in the marginal cost estimates used in the 
simulations reported.  Extensions of this model could include control costs as an added 
term in Equation 1A above.  As an alternative to data provided by eGrid, data is available 
from EIA Form 860 data to identify some of the important control technologies used at 
each generator in each year and summary estimates from the engineering literature like 
those shown in Table 1A could be created for the various emissions technologies employed.   
Renewable source marginal costs reported in Table 1A are based only on variable 
O&M costs reported in the literature.  Fuel costs for these sources are zero.  The literature 
is sparse with respect to O&M costs for such plants, particularly wind and solar 
installations.  Further, these costs are likely quite variable and plant dependent as 
technology for these sources continues to change at a rapid pace.  Further work to identify 
such costs could improve the accuracy of simulation results with respect to potential profit 
estimations for these sources. The lack of such data, however, should not change their 
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dispatch outcome and therefore the pricing outcomes in simulations like those reported 
here as it is generally understood that the marginal costs of such plants are far below those 
of traditional combustion-powered generators.   
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Table 1A:  Assumptions used to Model Generation Marginal Costs 
Fuel Technology Assumed Efficiency Fuel cost Freight rate 
(ton-mile) 
O&M Variable 
Cost/MWh 
Bituminous 
Coal 
Steam turbine 
sub-critical 
boiler 
Pre-1970: 28% 
1970-1989: 30% 
Post-1989: 30% 
$42/short 
ton 
$0.0655 
Uinta Basin 
 
$4.25 rising at 
1.5% per year  
 Steam turbine 
super-critical 
boiler 
Pre-1970: 31.5% 
1970-1989: 35% 
Post-1989: 31.5% 
   
Sub-
bituminous 
Coal  
Steam turbine 
sub-critical 
boiler 
Pre-1970: 28% 
1970-1989: 30% 
Post-1989: 30% 
$15/short 
ton 
$0.0655 
Uinta Basin 
$0.0221 PRB 
coal 
$4.25 rising at 
1.5% per year 
 Steam turbine 
super-critical 
boiler 
Pre-1970: 28% 
1970-1989: 30% 
Post-1989: 30% 
   
Natural Gas Combined-cycle 1980-1999: 40.8% 
Post-1999: 47.5% 
falling at 0.2% per year 
$4.97/mcf 
(WY & SD) 
$4.91/mcf 
(CO) 
N.A. $4.42 
$4.28 with 
duct-firing 
 Gas turbine Pre-1997: 30.5% 
1997-2005: 32.1% 
Post-2005: 39.9% 
falling at 0.05% per 
year 
 N.A. $25.72 
Small (25 MW 
or less) 
$26.10 
 Internal 
combustion 
(Wartsila 
engine) 
38% falling at 0.05% 
per year 
 N.A. $15 
 Internal 
combustion 
35% falling at 0.05% 
per year 
 N.A. 0.0233*MW 
output - 0.1209  
 Steam Turbine 30.3%   N.A. $4.25 rising at 
1.5% per year 
Renewable Gas Internal 
combustion 
35% falling at 0.05% 
per year 
$2/mcf N.A. 0.0233*MW 
output - 0.1209 
 Gas Turbine 30.5%   $26.10 
Petroleum 
(diesel fuel) 
Internal 
combustion  
33.3% falling at 0.2% 
per year 
$2.25/gal N.A. 0.0233*MW 
output - 0.1209 
 Gas turbine 25.6%  N.A. $26.10 
Hydro (Water) Simple turbine N.A. N.A. N.A. $3.11 
 Pumped storage    $13.47 
Wind 1.5 MW Turbine N.A. N.A. N.A. $3.10  
Solar  Photo-voltaic N.A. N.A. N.A. $0.80 
Sources: Nyberg (2011), Nichols et al (2008), Beer (2006), CPUC (2007), EPA (2010), Hassler (2009), 
Brooks (2000), Ragland and Stenzel (2000), NWPP (2002), Simon et al. (2007), Klein and Rednam (2007), 
Kaplan (2008), EPRI (2011), Wärtsilä Corp. (2005).     
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Table 2A: Energy Conversion Equivalents Used:   
 1MWh = 3,412,141.63 btu 
 1 short-ton (2000 lbs) bituminous coal =  23,400,000 btu 
 1 short-ton (2000 lbs) sub-bituminous coal =  17,600,000 btu 
 1 mcf (one thousand cubic feet) natural gas = 1,020,000 btu 
 1 mcf (one thousand cubic feet) methane or land-fill gas = 500,000 btu 
 1 US gallon diesel fuel = 129,500 btu 
 
 
 
